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WILLS - APPORTIONMENT OF ESTATE TAX - UNIFORM 
ESTATE TAX APPORTIONMENT ACT HELD TO REQUffiE 
THAT ONLY CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE MAY 
DIRECT THAT RESIDUARY LEGATEES BEAR THE ESTATE 
TAXON THE WHOLE OF THE ESTATE. JOHNSON v. HALL, 283 
Md. 644, 392 A.2d 1103 (1978). 
1. INTRODUCTION 
At death, a decedent's taxable estate is subject to federal and state 
estate taxes. 1 Maryland's Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act,2 
remedial legislation designed to abrogate a harsh common law rule,3 
directs that these. taxes be paid on a pro rata basis by all parties 
with interests in the tax-generating assets. 4 The Act includes an 
exception provision permitting the testator to provide for imposition 
of the estate tax burden in a manner other than apportionment.5 In 
Johnson v. Hall, 6 the Court of Appeals of Maryland construed the 
will of Catherine Johnson, M.D., which directed that all debts, 
expenses and taxes "be paid as soon after my death as can lawfully 
and conveniently be done."7 The court held, in a five-to-one decision, 
that this language was too unclear and ambiguous to operate as a 
directive against apportionment.8 In so holding, the court declined to 
align Maryland with the majority of jurisdictions that have 
construed similar language - holding it to express an intent that 
1. See I.R.C. §§ 2001-2621 (Federal); MD. ANN. CODE art. 62A (Supp. 1979). 
Under the federal statute, the taxable estate is determined by subtracting 
allowable deductions from the value of the decedent's gross estate. I.R.C. § 2051. 
These deductions, set forth in I.R.C. §§ 2053-2057, include federal and adminis-
trative expenses, claims against the estate, uncompensated casualty losses 
arising during the settlement of the estate, transfers for public, charitable, and 
religious uses, the marital deduction for certain bequests to the surviving spouse, 
and the orphan's deduction. S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANIEL & H. 
GUTMAN, FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION (1977). A limited credit against 
the federal estate tax is allowed for the amount of state estate and inheritance 
taxes paid. I.R.C. § 2011. 
The Maryland estate tax is equal to the remainder, if any, resulting from the 
subtraction of state taxes, including other jurisdictions' death taxes, from the 
amount due under the federal scheme, as computed under I.R.C. § 2011(b). MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 62A, § 2 (Supp. 1979). 
2. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-109 (1974). 
3. See text accompanying notes 16-19 infra. 
4. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-109(b) (1974). 
5. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-109(k) (1974) provides that the statutory rule 
of apportionment applies "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in the will." 
A testator does not always have the power to avoid apportionment of estate 
taxes. Where he directs, for example, that the taxes be imposed solely upon the 
residuary estate, and it happens that the amount of tax is greater than the value 
of the residue, the excess will be apportioned among the general and specific 
legatees. In re Estate of Thompson, 118 N.H. 361, 386 A.2d 1280 (1978); Mitnick, 
State Legislative Apportionment of the Federal Estate Tax, 10 MD. L. REV. ·289, 
314 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Mitnick]. 
6. 283 Md. 644, 392 A.2d 1103 (1978). 
7. Brief for Appellant at E.1, Johnson v. Hall, 283 Md. 644, 392 A.2d 1103 (1978). 
8. 283 Md. at 657, 392 A.2d at 1111. 
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estate taxes be paid entirely from the residuary portion ofthe estate.9 
Johnson reflects the court's strict adherence to the cardinal principle 
of will construction in apportionment disputes that, to be effective, 
testamentary language asserted to direct against apportionment 
must be clear and unambiguous. lO The holding is consonant with 
two other recent Maryland decisions in which the courts declined to 
give effect to controverted testamentary language when to do so 
might frustrate the purpose of remedial legislation.ll 
II. STATUTORY IMPOSITION OF THE ESTATE TAX 
BURDEN - AN HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The first estate tax statute was enacted by Congress in 1916.12 
This tax, levied upon the decedent's estate as a whole,13 was justified 
as the price of the privilege of transferring property at death.14 
Because this statute did not designate upon whose interests the tax 
would be imposed,15 a rule developed at common law that estate 
taxes were payable from the residuary portion of the estate, absent 
9. E.g., Starr v. Watrous, 116 Conn. 448, 165 A. 459 (1933); In re Estate of Collins, 
368 So. 2d 1350 (F1a. 1979); In re Bett's Estate, 2 lli. App. 2d 453, 119 N.E.2d 801 
(1954); University of Louisville v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 499 S.W.2d 288 
(Ky. 1973) (overruling McKinney v. Mt. Sterling Nat'l Bank, 310 Ky. 186, 220 
S.W.2d 379 (1949»; In re Jones, 172 So. 2d 312 (La. App. 1965); Thomas v. Fox, 
348 Mass. 152,202 N.E.2d 912 (1964); In re Hund's Will, 266 AD. 379, 42 N.Y.S.2d 
505 (1943) (per curiam); Gaither v. United States Trust Co., 230 S.C. 568, 97 
S.E.2d 24 (1957); In re Cudahy's Will, 251 Wis. 116, 28 N.W.2d 340 (1947); In re 
Ogburn's Estate, 406 P.2d 655 (Wyo. 1965). 
10. "Practically all the cases agree that a directive against apportionment should be 
expressed in clear and unambiguous language." In re Ogburn's Estate, 406 P.2d 
655, 657 (Wyo. 1965). E.g., Estate of Lindner, 85 Cal. App. 3d 219, 223, 149 Cal. 
Rptr. 331, 335 (1978); In re Estate of Kelly, 584 P.2d 640, 641 (Colo. App. 1978); 
Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. Sullivan, 142 Conn. 685, 692, 116 A2d 908, 
912-13 (1955); Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 318 Mass. 563, 
577, 62 N.E.2d 831, 839 (1945); In re Pepper's Estate, 307 N.Y. 242, 246, 120 
N.E.2d 807, 808-09 (1954); In re Estate of Erieg, 439 Pa. 550, 556, 267 A2d 841, 
845 (1970); In re Estate of Henderson, 46 Wash. 2d 401, 402, 281 P.2d 857, 858 
(1955); In re Estate of Hilliar, 498 P.2d 1237, 1239 (Wyo. 1972). Annot., 71 
A.L.R.3d 247, 315 (1976). 
11. See text accompanying notes 80-95 infra. 
12. Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 271, §§ 200-212, 39 Stat. 777-80 (1916). A tax 
was imposed on the transfer of decedents' estates. Id. at § 202. The constitutional-
ity of this statute was upheld in New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 
(1921). See generally C. LoWNDES, R. KRAMER & J. McCORD, FEDERAL ESTATE 
AND GIFT TAXES § 3.2 (3d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as LoWNDES]. 
13. The estate tax differs from an inheritance tax. The latter is a tax on the right to 
receive property from a decedent. In contrast, the estate tax is imposed upon the 
decedent's right to transfer property at death. 1 R. PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND 
GIFT TAXATION § 1.05 (1942). 
14. LOWNDES, supra note 12, at § 1.1. 
15. Limited exceptions exist in the Internal Revenue Code. Recipients of life 
insurance proceeds included in the decedent's estate and recipients of a power of 
appointment over estate property must contribute the amount of tax generated 
by inclusion of those assets in the gross estate, unless the decedent directs 
otherwise in his will. I.R.C. §§ 2206, 2207. 
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expression of a contrary intent by the testator.lS Application of the 
common law rule often substantially distorted the testator's overall 
testamentary plan, especially when taxable property passed outside 
his estate.17 In many instances the burden of unforeseen estate taxes 
severely diminished the share of the residuary legatees,18 who were 
often closely related to or dependent relatives of the testator. The 
harsh effect of the common law rule upon such natural objects of the 
testator's bounty prompted many states to enact estate tax 
apportionment statuteS.19 
Estate tax apportionment statutes typically prorate the estate 
tax burden among· those beneficiaries whose interests in the estate 
contribute toward generating the tax.ro The first such legislation in 
Maryland, enacted in 1937, followed this scheme.21 This act proved 
too· restricted in scope,22 however, and in 1945, it was revised to 
broaden its coverage.23 In 1965, the Maryland General Assembly 
16. See Powell, Ultimate Liability for Federal Estate Taxes, 1958 WASH. U.L.Q. 327, 
329 [hereinafter cited as Powell]. Aside from the exceptions mentioned in note 15 
supra, the manner of determining who must pay the estate tax assessment is 
governed by state law. Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95, 97-98 (1942). 
Commentators differ over whether a federal statute should govern the allocation 
of the federal estate tax. Those in favor of federal legislation in this area see a 
need to reduce private and interstate conflicts. Scoles & Stephens, The Proposed 
Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act, 43 MINN. L. REV. 907 (1959) [hereinafter 
cited as Scoles & Stephens]. The opposite side views any attempt by the federal 
government to dictate the manner of allocating the burden of the debts of the 
decedent, even those debts created by federal law, as an unnecessary invasion of 
territory "naturally controllable" by the states. Gump, Apportionment of the 
Federal Estate Tax, 6 MD. L. REV. 195, 204 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Gump]. 
17. Scoles & Stephens, supra note 16, at 915. Many testators unwittingly thought 
that they were providing for their loved ones by leaving them the residuary 
estate. Id. 
18. See, e.g., In re Mill's Estate, 189 Misc. 136, 141, 64 N.Y.S.2d 105, 109-10 (1946), 
aff'd, 272 A.D. 229, 70 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1947), aff'd mem., 297 N.Y. 1012, 80 N.E.2d 
535 (1948). 
19. See, e.g., In re Edwards' Estate, 377 Pa. 606, 610, 105 A.2d 312, 315 (1954). New 
York enacted the first estate tax apportionment statute. See NEW YORK 
DECEDENTS' ESTATE LAw § 124 (1930) (now N.Y. ESTS., POWERS & TRUSTS LAw 
§ 2-1.8 (McKinney 1967». 
20. See Scoles & Stephens, supra note 16, at 915. The statutes, however, are not 
uniformly applied. Some states' apportionment statutes apportion taxes only 
among those parties with interests in the non-probate estate, while others include 
beneficiaries of probate property as well. Id. at 915 n.35. 
21. Law of June 1, 1937, ch. 546, 1937 Md. Laws 1320 (repealed in 1947). 
22. The 1937 Act failed to cover the proceeds of taxable life insurance or an 
appointee under a taxable power of appointment. The statute did not require 
contribution from a joint tenant or a tenant by the entireties. Moreover, the Act 
failed to provide for contribution from any legatee of probate assets. Gump, 
supra note 16, at 205. See Karch, The Apportionment of Death Taxes, 54 HARV. 
L. REV. 10, 35-36 n.108 (1940). 
23. Law of June 1, 1947, ch. 156, 1947 Md. Laws 223 (repealed in 1965). Unlike its 
predecessor, the 1947 Act required contribution from life insurance proceeds 
receivable by a beneficiary other than the executor, from property over which the 
decedent had a power of appointment, and from any other property included in 
the gross estate but not included in the decedent's estate under Maryland's 
intestacy laws. Mitnick, supra note 5, at 300. 
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enacted the present apportionment statute,24 which provides in 
pertinent part: 
The tax shall be apportioned among all persons interested in 
the estate. The apportionment shall be made in the 
proportion that the value of the interest of each person 
interested in the estate bears to the total value of the 
interests of all persons interested in the estate. The values 
used in determining the tax shall be used for that purpose.25 
In addition, the statute specifies that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided 
in the will, or other controlling instrument, the provisions of this 
section shall apply to the apportionment of, and contribution to, the 
federal and Maryland estate taxes."26 In short, apportionment is 
mandatory unless the text of the will or other controlling instrument 
expresses a contrary intent. 27 
The most frequently litigated estate tax apportionment issue is 
whether the language used in the decedent's will is sufficient to 
overcome the rebuttable presumption that the testator intended that 
24. Law of June 1, 1965, ch. 907, 1965 Md. Laws 1551 (codified at MD. EST. & TRUSTS 
CODE ANN. §11-109 (1974». By passing this legislation, the Maryland General 
Assembly enacted its own version of the Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment 
Act. 
25. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-109(b) (1974). 
26. Id. at § 11-109(k). 
Currently, ten states have enacted either the 1958 or the 1964 version of the 
Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act. In the absence of legislation, a testator 
had no power to designate that non-testamentary assets should bear their pro 
rata share of the tax. This was the case regardless of whether the recipients were 
residents or non-residents of the state. The 1958 Act enabled the testator to 
designate that that portion of the tax attributable to non-testamentary assets be 
recovered from the recipients. Moreover, the 1958 Act was drafted to deal with 
the jurisdictional problem encountered when property included in the decedent's 
taxable estate was transferred inter vivos to a non-resident, enabling executors 
to collect the pro rata share of the tax from the non-resident recipient. Four states 
retain the 1958 version of the Uniform Act. ALASKA STAT. § 13.16.610 (Supp. 
1979); MICH. COMPo LAws ANN. §§ 720.11 to 720.21 (1968); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 88-A:l to 88-A:12 (1970); WYo. STAT. §§ 2-7-101 to 2-7-111 (Supp. 1977). 
The 1964 version of the Act amended the 1958 version in two respects. It 
provided for the apportionment of the expenses incurred by the estate in 
connection with the determination of the tax and its apportionment. See, e.g., 
MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-109(c)(3) (1974). The 1964 act, in providing a 
non-resident fiduciary a remedy against a resident of the state, eliminated the 
necessity of federal reciprocity provisions. See MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. 
§ 11-109(h) (1974). Six states have enacted the 1964 version of the Uniform 
Estate Tax Apportionment Act. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 236A-l to 236A-9 (1976); 
MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-109 (1974); N.D. CENT. CODE §30.1-2D-16 
(1976); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 116.303 to 116.383 (Supp. 1977); R.I. GEN. LAws 
§§44-23.1-1 to 44-23.1-12 (Supp. 1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§7301 to 7309 
(Supp. 1978). The Uniform Probate Code has copied the Uniform Estate Tax 
Apportionment Act. See U.P.C. § 3-916. 
27. Johnson v. Hall, 283 Md. 644, 648, 392 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1978). 
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the taxes on his estate be apportioned.28 Arising from this litigation 
is the cardinal judicial principle that in order to defeat the 
application of an apportionment scheme, the testator's expression of 
a contrary intent must be clear and unambiguous.29 This cardinal 
principle lay at the heart of the controversy surrounding Catherine 
Johnson's. will.3D 
III. THE APPORTIONMENT DISPUTE IN JOHNSON 
At her death, Catherine W. Johnson, M.D., left a will disposing 
of a gross estate valued at approximately $580,000.00. The controver-
sial tax clause appeared in the first provision of her will. It provided: 
FIRST: I direct that all lawful debts lowe at the time of my 
death, including funeral and administrative expenses and 
the expenses of my last illness (but not including debts 
secured by mortgages on real property, except matured 
obligations as they fall due) and all estate and inheritance 
taxes be paid as soon after my death as can lawfully and 
conveniently be done. 31 
The third clause established specific bequests. Among these were 
gifts of stock to two doctors who attended Dr. Johnson in her final 
illness, W. Luther Hall and James M. Bacos.32 The last of the 
28. Mitnick, supra note 5, at 310. Equitable apportionment of the estate taxes is the 
presumed intention of testators. E.g., In re Estate of Erieg, 439 Pa. 550, 556, 267 
A.2d 841, 845 (1970). 
29. See note 10 supra. 
In addition, the courts have fashioned several "corollary" principles when 
questions of apportionment arise. For instance, those who contend that a will 
directs against apportionment bear the burden of proof. E.g., In re Estate of 
Cummings, 263 Cal. App. 2d 661, 668, 69 Cal. Rptr. 792, 797 (1968); In re Pepper's 
Estate, 307 N.Y. 242, 250-51, 120 N.E.2d 807, 811 (1954); In re Estate of Hilliar, 
498 P.2d 1237, 1239 (Wyo. 1972). See also Annot., 71 A.L.R.3d 247, 310 (1976). 
Furthermore, will provisions asserted to direct against apportionment are subject 
to strict construction; doubts are resolved in favor of apportionment. E.g., In re 
Estate of Hilliar, 498 P.2d 1237, 1239 (Wyo. 1972). See also Annot., 71 A.L.R.3d 
247, 319 (1976). 
30. Both Maryland appellate courts recognized that "[i]n a tax allocation problem 
the text of the will is to be scanned only to see if there is a clear direction not to 
apportion, and if such explicit direction is not found, construction of text ceases 
because the statute states the rule." Johnson v. Hall, 283 Md. 644, 649, 392 A.2d 
1103, 1107 (1978) (quoting In re Mill's Estate, 189 Misc. 136, 142,64 N.Y.S.2d 105, 
110 (1946) (emphasis in original), aff'd, 272 A.D. 229, 70 N.Y.S.2d 746 (1947), 
aff'd, 297 N.Y. 1012,80 N.E.2d 535 (1948), quoted in Hall v. Johnson, 38 Md. App. 
589, 596, 382 A.2d 332, 336 (1978». 
31. Johnson v. Hall, 283 Md. 644, 650, 392 A.2d 1103, 1107 (1978) (emphasis added). 
32. Drs. Hall and Bacos were the personal physicians of the testatrix. Id. at 646, 392 
A.2d at 1105. Prior to the apportionment dispute, the testatrix' husband and 
daughter instituted a caveat proceeding to have the doctors' bequests declared 
void on the ground of undue influence. The parties reached a settlement on this 
matter. and the physicians agreed to have their legacies reduced by 15%.Id. at 647 
n.2, 392 A.2d at 1105 n.2. 
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dispositive clauses established a residuary trust for the testatrix' son 
Carman, who had a history of recurring mental illness.33 
Prior to making a final accounting and distribution, Dr. 
Johnson's personal representative34 sought approval from the 
Orphans' Court of Prince George's County to apportion the federal 
estate tax according to Maryland's Uniform Estate Tax Apportion-
ment Act. The two doctors opposed apportionment, asserting that 
the will directed that the estate tax be paid entirely from the 
residuary trust. 
IV. JOHNSON IN THE COURTS 
A. The Orphans' Court 
The issue before the orphans' court was whether "Article 
FIRST" of Dr. Johnson's will, directing that "debts ... expenses 
.. '. [and] taxes" be paid promptly, indicated an intent by Dr. 
Johnson that the federal estate tax be imposed solely upon the 
residuary legatee. The court found that the controversial language in 
the first clause of the will was "not of the explicit nature to warrant 
abatement of the apportionment of taxes,"35 and ruled that 
Maryland's statute required that the taxes on Dr. Johnson's estate 
be apportioned. 
B. The Court of Special Appeals 
On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland36 construed 
the first clause of the will in conjunction with other clauses in the 
will, and held that it sufficiently evidenced an intent to avoid 
apportionment. It reversed the orphans' court, and ordered satisfac-
tion of the estate tax liability solely from the residuary portion of the 
estate.3? Inasmuch as the court agreed with the cardinal principle 
universally applied in resolving apportionment disputes, it evidently 
concluded that the tax clause constituted a clear and unambiguous 
expression of an intent not to apportion.38 
In deciding the issue, one of first impression in Maryland,39 the 
court of special appeals considered itself bound by the apportion-
33. There were indications in the Johnson will that the continuous care of Carman 
was the paramount concern of the testatrix. See Brief for Appellant at E.2- E.6, 
Johnson v. Hall, 283 Md. 644, 392 A.2d 1103 (1978). 
34. The personal representative was Jule Abner Johnson, another son of the 
testatrix. 283 Md. at 646, 392 A.2d at 1105. 
35. See Brief for Appellant at E.59, Johnson v. Hall, 283 Md. 644, 392 A.2d 1103 
(1978). 
36. Hall v. Johnson, 38 Md. App. 589, 382 A.2d 332 (1978). 
37. [d. at 598, 382 A.2d at 337. 
38. [d. at 597, 382 A.2d at 337. See note 10 and accompanying text supra. 
39. The court of special appeals stated, "[ t]he precise issue put to us does not appear 
to have been decided by an appellate court of this State, although courts of other 
States have come to grips with the matter." [d. at 593, 382 A.2d at 334. 
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ment statute's uniformity of construction provision40 to follow only 
cases from Uniform Act jurisdictions.41 The Maryland statute states 
that "[s]uch of the provisions of this section as are uniform with 
statutes enacted in other states shall be so construed as to effectuate 
their purpose to make uniform the laws of those states which enact 
such provisions."42 The court of special appeals found cases on point 
from two such jurisdictions. In those decisions, courts in New 
Hampshire43 and Wyoming44 construed tax clauses similar to that in 
Dr. Johnson's will. Both interpreted such clauses to express an 
intent to avoid apportionment. 
The court of special appeals used reasoning similar to that 
employed in the Wyoming case, In re Ogburn's Estate,45 when it 
noted that because Catherine Johnson was a successful medical 
doctor guided by competent legal advice in the preparation of her 
will, it was "safe to infer that Dr. Johnson possessed a reasonable 
command of the English language and knew what she had written 
in Article FIRST of her Will."46 Refusing to allow the tax clause to 
pass without legally operative consequences, the court imputed to 
the testatrix an awareness that the first clause of her will implied a 
direction against apportionment of estate taxes.47 However, the court 
did not indicate why, if the tax clause had to be given some legally 
operative consequences, those consequences need consist of a 
departure from the statutory apportionment scheme. The New 
Hampshire court, on the other hand, stated that its examination of 
the will in that case revealed that the testatrix preferred the specific 
legatees to the residuary beneficiaries and, consequently, that the 
testatrix intended the latter to bear the tax burden.48 The Wyoming 
40. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-109(i) (1974). 
41. The standard Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act's uniformity of interpreta-
tion provision provides: "This Act shall be construed to effectuate its general 
purpose to make uniform the laws of those states which enact it." UNIFORM 
ESTATE TAX ApPORTIONMENT ACT §9 (1964). 
42. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-109(i) (1974). While the standard Act focuses 
its call for uniformity of construction only upon those states that have adopted 
the Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act, the Maryland Act's uniformity 
clause is not similarly restricted. Despite this difference, the court of special 
appeals implicitly accepted the idea that cases on point in states that have 
adopted the Uniform Act are to be considered more persuasive than decisions 
from jurisdictions which have not enacted it. Hall v. Johnson, 38 Md. App. 589, 
593-94, 382 A.2d 332, 335 (1978). But see note 55 infra. 
43. In re Crozier's Estate, 105 N.H. 440, 201 A.2d 895 (1964). 
44. In re Ogburn's Estate, 406 P.2d 655 (Wyo. 1965). 
45.Id. 
46. Hall v. Johnson, 38 Md. App. 589, 597, 382 A.2d 332, 337 (1978). 
47. Id. The court of special appeals evidently believed that Catherine Johnson 
included the word "tax" purposefully and with the intent that the tax not be 
apportioned. The court's reasoning, that a testator's use of a tax clause is not 
mere surplusage, has been used in other cases that hold clauses directing 
payment of taxes are directions against apportionment. E.g., In re Estate of 
Collins, 368 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 1979); University of Louisville v. Liberty Nat'l Bank 
& Trust Co., 499 S.W.2d 288, 290 (Ky. 1973) (overruling McKinney v. Mt. Sterling 
Nat'l Bank, 310 Ky. 186, 220 S.W.2d 379 (1949». 
48. In re Crozier's Estate, 105 N.H. 440, 442, 201 A.2d 895, 896-97 (1964). 
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court found that, "inclusion of the tax clause in the introductory 
portion of the will directing payment of debts and expenses, which 
are ordinarily satisfied from the residuary estate, indicates that the 
testatrix intended that the death taxes be paid from the same 
source."49 No comparable reasoning is found in the opinion of the 
court of special appeals. 50 
C. The Court of Appeals 
The court of appeals,51 unlike the court of special appeals, did 
not interpret the Maryland apportionment statute's uniformity of 
construction provision52 to require Maryland courts to follow only 
the cases from New Hampshire53 and Wyoming.54 Thus, it examined 
decisions on point in numerous jurisdictions that have enacted 
apportionment statutes. 55 The court recognized that a vast major-
ity56 of these jurisdictions have held that tax clauses similar to 
"Article FIRST" in Dr. Johnson's will sufficiently manifest an 
intention not to prorate the tax burden.57 It nevertheless refused to 
follow the majority view, 58 stating, "We decline to accept as 
persuasive authority cases which appear to change the judicial role 
from one of discerning intent to one of creating it on the basis of 
vague implications and innuendos."59 
49. In re Ogburn's Estate, 406 P.2d 655, 659 (Wyo. 1965). 
50. What reasoning there is seems inconsistent. While the court was willing to allow 
the direction in the first article to pay debts and expenses to pass without legally 
operative consequences, Le., that such direction was not intended to affect the 
source of payment for these charges, it inexplicably found that the mention of 
taxes in the same clause had the effect of altering the source from which the 
taxes are normally paid. The court stated: "Certainly, the first portion of the 
Article is a mere formal recitation directing the personal representative to do 
what the law clearly requires be done, but the law does not require that bequests 
be paid over free and clear of federal estate taxes." Hall v. Johnson, 38 Md. App. 
589, 597-98, 382 A.2d 332, 337 (1978) (emphasis in original). The judicial 
presumption that words in a will are never to be rejected as meaningless or 
repugnant if by any reasonable construction they may be given effect, Cole v. 
Bailey, 218 Md. 177, 181, 146 A.2d 14, 16 (1958), and the presumption that a 
testatrix does not use superfluous language in her will, National State Bank v. 
Nadeau, 57 N.J. Super. 53,63,153 A.2d 854,859 (1959), need not have determined 
the outcome of the case. Other courts have treated the direction to pay taxes as 
surplusage. See, e.g., In re Estate of Carrington, 1 Ohio Op. 2d 72, 74, 136 N.E.2d 
182, 185 (P. Ct. 1956). 
51. Johnson v. Hall, 283 M!I. 644, 392 A.2d 1103 (1978). 
52. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-109(i) (1974). 
53. In re Crozier's Estate, 105 N.H. 440, 201 A.2d 895 (1964). 
54. In re Ogburn's Estate, 406 P.2d 655 (Wyo. 1965). 
55. The court of appeals noted that because Maryland's statute differs from the 
standard Uniform Act, Maryland courts are not constrained to follow only 
authority from Uniform Act jurisdictions. 283 Md. at 653-54 n.9, 392 A.2d at 1109 
n.9. 
56. See note 9 and accompanying text supra. 
57. 283 Md. at 650, 392 A.2d at 1107. 
58. Id. at 651, 392 A.2d at 1108. 
59. Id. at 654 n.9, 392 A.2d at 1109 n.9. 
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The Johnson court of appeals decision cited the analysis in a 
Virginia case, Baylor v. National Bank of Commerce,60 as typifying 
the reasoning employed by the courts adopting the majority view. 
Under this analysis, a testator, by grouping debts, taxes, and 
expenses together in a single clause, manifests an intent that "all of 
the items [are] to be treated alike and to be paid in the same manner 
and from the same fund."61 Applying the common law presumption 
that, unless otherwise pr.ovided in the will, debts and expenses are 
charged to the residue,62 the Baylor court reasoned that, because 
taxes had been grouped with debts and expenses, they were intended 
to be treated in like fashion and charged to the residue.63 The court 
of appeals rejected this reasoning,64 arguing that inferring the intent 
to impose the estate tax burden solely upon the residuary estate 
mereiy because the will grouped taxes with debts and expenses gave 
the common law presumption precedence over the statutory 
presumption that estate taxes are intended to be apportioned.65 
Because the court considered the common law and statutory 
presumptions coequal, it concluded that it should draw no inference 
from the fact that the testatrix grouped the debts, taxes, and 
expenses together in the same clause.66 In support of its decision, the 
Johnson court pointed out that the analysis employed by the Baylor 
court could, with equal justification, be used to sustain an argument 
that· grouping debts and expenses with taxes in a single clause 
expresses an intent to apportion debts and expenses among the 
beneficiaries. 6 7 
The court of appeals recognized that by declining to follow the 
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, it might appear to be 
ignoring the apportionment statute's uniformity of construction 
provision.68 It reasoned, however, that its decision was in harmony 
with the other states' interpretations of their apportionment statutes, 
because all jurisdictions on both sides of the controversy agree that 
in order to defeat an apportionment statute the intent of the testator 
must be clear and unambiguous.69 The difference in the court's 
holding was explained as a difference in the construction of the 
language in the will, not in the construction of the exception 
provision in the statute. 70 
60. 194 Va. 1, 72 S.E.2d 282 (1952). 
61: Id. at 5, 72 S.E.2d at 284. 
62. See T. ATKINSON, WILLS § 136 (2d ed. 1953). 
63. 194 Va. at 5, 72 S.E.2d at 284. 
64. Johnson v. Hall, 283 Md. 644, 652, 392 A.2d 1103, 1108 (1978). 
65. Id. at 652-53, 392 A.2d at 1108. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 655, 392 A.2d at 1110. 
68. Id. at 653, 392 A.2d at 1109. See text accompanying note 42 supra. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. It is doubtful that the Maryland statute's uniformity of construction provision 
was intended to govern the construction of wills, as this would frequently 
contravene the testator's intent. See text accompanying notes 104-111 infra. 
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The court also addressed the argument that failure to infer a 
direction against apportionment from the first clause in Dr. 
Johnson's will would render the clause legally meaningless, because 
payment of taxes was already the statutory duty of the personal 
representative. 71 Although it acknowledged the rule of construction 
that "words in a will are never to be rejected as meaningless or 
repugnant if by any reasonable construction they may be given 
effect and made consistent and significant,"72 the court found its 
interpretation of the tax clause in harmony with this rule of 
construction, saying: 
Simply because the words of the will restate the law or add 
nothing of substance to what would have occurred without 
them does not deprive those words of their effect for they are 
indica:ive of the testator's intent and must be respected and 
carried out independently of any parallel consistent provi-
sion of the law.73 
The court of appeals further buttressed its argument by noting that, 
the logic of the [doctors'] argument - that by mentioning 
taxes the testatrix must have intended something other than 
what the law provides - requires that they likewise be able 
to assign some special role, other than one parroting the 
law, to the remainder of the words of the first clause 
directing payment of expenses and debts. This they make no 
effort to do. 74 
The court of appeals considered two other arguments raised by 
the doctors in support of their contention that Dr. Johnson's will 
directed against apportionment. The tenth clause in the will 
empowered the personal representative to pay the charges enumer-
ated in the first clause either from real property or personalty. 
Because only the residuary portion of the estate included real 
property, the doctors contended that Dr. Johnson therefore intended 
the payment of all enumerated charges in the first clause, including 
taxes, from the residuary estate. The court rejected this contention, 
construing the tenth clause as a provision permitting the personal 
representative to satisfy from realty or personalty any claim the 
,71. Id. at 654-55,392 A.2d at 1110. The personal representative has a statutory duty 
to pay the estate tax under Maryland and federal law. See MD. EST. & TRUSTS 
CODE ANN. § 7-401(j) (1974); I.R.C. § 2002. This obligation is an administrative 
rule ensuring payment of the tax, and does not in any way affect the rights of the 
heirs and distributees as among themselves. Trimble v. Hatcher's Executors, 295 
Ky, 178, 184, 173 S.W.2d 985, 988, cert. denied, 321 U.S. 747 (1943). 
72. Johnson v. Hall, 283 Md. 644, 654, 392 A.2d 1103, 1110 (1978) (quoting Cole v. 
Bailey, 218 Md. 177, 181, 146 A.2d 14, 16 (1958». 
73. 283 Md. at 654-55, 392 A.2d at 1110. 
74. Id. at 655, 392 A.2d at 1110. 
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residuary legatee ultimately owed, rather than as a directive 
carrying a necessary implication that the estate taxes be paid from 
the residue. 75 Because the priority in abatement rule between real 
and personal property has been abrogated by statute in Maryland, 
the court viewed the tenth clause as a precautionary measure and 
another example of the testatrix' providing in her will for that which 
was already prescribed by law.76 
Finally, the court considered whether the arrangement of 
clauses in the Johnson will evidenced an intent not to apportion the 
taxes.77 Drs. Hall and Bacos argued that the order of the will 
provisions - the tax clause appearing first, followed by clauses 
establishing specific bequests, and concluding with a clause 
establishing the residuary trust - indicated that the testatrix 
intended the residue to consist of what remained after satisfaction of 
debts, taxes, expenses, and specific bequests.78 The court dismissed 
this argument, stating that the testatrix' arrangement of clauses . 
indicated nothing more than that the will was "artfully and logically 
drawn."79 
V. ANALYSIS 
Johnson v. Hallf{) is the most recent in a series of Maryland 
cases in which the appellate· courts have held controverted 
testamentary language to lack the clarity necessary to be legally 
effective in the manner contended. In Leidy Chemicals Foundation, 
Inc. v. First National Bank,81 the court of appeals ruled on the 
effectiveness of language asserted to exercise a power of appoint-
ment created by a deed of trust. In his residuary clause, the testator 
had bequeathed to a corporate foundation all the property that he 
had the "right to dispose of' at death.82 The trust deed restricted 
those who could take by appointment to persons and corporations 
75. Id. at 655-56,392 A.2d at 1110. Maryland courts, following the common law rule, 
historically satisfied estate debts from personal property before real property. 
Reno, The Maryland Order of Abatement of Legacies and Devises, 17 MD. L. 
REV. 285, 288-89, 291 (1957). 
76. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 9-103(b) (1974). 
77. Johnson v. Hall, 283 Md. 644, 656, 392 A.2d 1103, 1110 (1978). 
78.Id. 
79.Id. 
80. 283 Md. 644, 392 A.2d 1103 (1978). 
81. 276 Md. 689, 351 A.2d 129 (1976). 
82. Id. at 692, 351 A.2d at 130-31. The testator and his father were settlors of a life 
insurance trust which created the power. Id. at 690, 351 A.2d at 129-30. The 
testator's status as donee of the power of appointment was contingent upon his 
surviving his mother. Id. at 691, 351 A.2d at 130. His mother was living at the 
time he executed his will, but predeceased the testator shortly thereafter. Id. 
Hence, the testator's power of appointment had not vested when he executed his 
will. This may serve to explain why his bequest of the appointive property to the 
chemical foundation was framed in the uncertain language, bequeathing "all 
... property ... which I own or have the right to dispose of at the time of my 
death." Id. at 692, 351 A.2d at 130. 
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expressly designated by the donee-testator.83 Construing the purpose 
of this restriction to be identical to that of a Maryland statute84 
designed to prevent the inadvertent exercise of powers of appoint-
ment, the court held that the language in the testator's residuary 
clause was not explicit enough to exercise the power in favor of the 
foundation. 85 
Similarly, in Caruthers v. Buscher,86 the court of special appeals 
addressed the issue of whether, by directing the payment of all just 
debts from his estate, a testator had evidenced an intent sufficiently 
clear to exonerate devised realty from an encumbrance.87 Maryland's 
83. Id. at 691, 351 A.2d at 130. Instead of construing this language to require the 
testator to appoint expressly who shall take the property by appointment, the 
court interpreted it to mean that the testator could exercise the power only by a 
reference in his will "to the instrument creating the power or . . . to the estate 
which was subject to the power." Id. at 695, 351 A.2d at 132. 
84. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 4-407 (1974) provides: 
Subject to the terms of the instrument creating the power, a residuary 
clause in a will exercises a power of appointment held by the testator 
only if: 
(1) An intent to exercise the power is expressly indicated in the will; 
or 
(2) The instrument creating the power of appointment fails to 
provide for disposition of the subject matter of the power upon its 
nonexercise. 
The deed of trust creating the power provided that in the event the testator 
did not expressly appoint named persons and corporations, the trust property 
should pass to those persons who would have taken as his heirs had he died 
intestate. 276 Md. at 691, 351 A.2d at 130. Thus, apart from the restriction in the 
trust deed, the power of appointment in Leidy could have been exercised, if at all, 
only under MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 4-407(1) (1974). Referring to the 
restriction in the deed of trust, the court noted that "the draftsman used the 
language customarily used by careful draftsmen to minimize the possibility of an 
inadvertent exercise of the power." 276 Md. at 696, 351 A.2d at 132-33. Earlier in 
the opinion, the court stated that the purpose of MD. EST. & TRUST CODE ANN. 
§ 4-407 was "to prevent an inadvertent exercise of the power, which had been 
possible under the prior law." Id. at 694, 351 A.2d at 132. 
85. 276 Md. at 697, 351 A.2d at 133. The court of appeals based its decision on the 
restriction in the trust deed requiring express language, Id. at 695, 351 A.2d at 
132, quoting the § 4-407 provision that it is "subject to the terms of the 
instrument creating the power." Id. at 694, 352 A.2d at 131 (emphasis in 
original). The court found that the purpose of the restriction was identical to the 
purpose of § 4-407. This may indicate that § 4-407(1) requires a testator's intent 
to exercise a power of appointment to be manifested by an express reference to 
the instrument creating the power or the estate subject to the power. See note 83 
supra. 
86. 38 Md. App. 661, 382 A.2d 608 (1978). 
87. The appellees' contention that the direction to pay all just debts indicated an 
intention to exonerate was strengthened by the testator's use of different 
language in two subparagraphs of his will, each devising a parcel of realty. In a 
devise of a condominium unit, the testator bequeathed the property to a legatee, 
"subject to his assuming the encumbrance thereon." Id. at 663, 382 A.2d at 610. 
In another subparagraph, the testator devised residential property encumbered 
at the time of the will's execution, but made no mention that it should pass 
subject to an encumbrance. Id. Nevertheless, the court indicated that this 
difference in language, even when construed with the direction to pay all debts, 
did not constitute the clear expression of intent, required by MD. EST. & TRUST 
CODE ANN. § 4-406, to exonerate the residential property from the encumbrance. 
38 Md. App. at 672, 382 A.2d at 615. 
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anti-exoneration statute requires that an intent to exonerate be 
indicated expressly in the will in order to be given effect.88 This 
statute was enacted to abrogate the unpopular common law rule that 
all encumbrances on a testator's real estate existing at the time of 
the will's execution are discharged using funds from his personal 
estate, unless a contrary intent is clearly manifested in the will. 89 In 
Caruthers, the court held that the testator's general direction to pay 
his just debts did not expressly indicate the intent to exonerate the 
devised realty. 9) 
The Leidy, Caruthers, and Johnson decisions highlight the 
deference paid by the courts to remedial legislation, and indicate 
that where the Maryland General Assembly has enacted such 
remedial legislation, only clear language will be given effect as a 
testamentary directive to depart from the remedial legislative 
scheme. This is particularly evident in Johnson, because there is no 
statutory requirement that an intent to impose estate taxes in a 
manner other than apportionment be expressly stated.91 The statutes 
in Leidy and Caruthers, however, both contained such a require-
ment.92 The legislature's omission of the word "expressly" from the 
exception provision93 in Maryland's apportionment statute provided 
the Johnson court with an opportunity and rationale to permit non-
apportionment in the instance of less than express language.94 The 
Johnson court allowed this opportunity to pass unexercised, 
suggesting that the court was concerned primarily with promoting 
88. MD. EST. & TRUST CODE ANN. § 4-406 (1974). This statute provides, in part: 
"Unless a contrary intent is expressly indicated in the will, a legacy of specific 
property shall pass subject to a security interest or lien on the property which 
existed at the time of the execution of the will .... " 
89. 38 Md. App. at 666-67, 382 A.2d at 612. 
90. [d. at 671, 382 A.2d at 615. 
91. Maryland's Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act states only that its 
provisions shall apply to the apportionment of estate taxes "[e]xcept as otherwise 
provided in the will." MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-109(k) (1974). 
92. See MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. §§ 4-407(1), 4-406 (1974). 
93. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-109(k) (1974). 
94. Moreover, there is authority that could have encouraged the court to accept the 
doctors' argument that Dr. Johnson's "Article FIRST" should be construed as a 
direction against apportionment. Under Maryland's 1947 estate tax apportion-
ment statute, language similar to that in the disputed tax clause would have 
been construed as a direction that taxes not be apportioned. This statute 
provided in part: . 
Whenever any decedent shall in substance provide in his will that any 
and all estate taxes on his estate shall be paid out of his estate, such 
provision shall be construed to exonerate from contribution to the 
payment of the estate tax all persons otherwise liable for contribution 
thereto under the provisions of this section, unless the decedent shall 
specifically direct such contribution. 
Law of June 1, 1947, ch. 156. § 126(5)(b), 1947 Md. Laws 227 (repealed 1965). 
Similarly, the Attorney General of Maryland advised in 1939 that when a will 
directed that "all transfer, inheritance, estate or succession taxes be paid out of 
my general estate," the testator intended that estate taxes should not be 
apportioned pursuant to the 1937 apportionment statute. 24 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 
884, 887 (1939). 
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the remedial purpose underlying Maryland's Uniform Estate Tax 
Apportionment Act.95 
In his dissenting opinion,96 Chief Judge Murphy contended that 
the Johnson majority had engrafted the word "expressly" onto the 
Maryland apportionment statute;97 Although the court did state at 
one point that a direction against apportionment must be "plainly 
stated,"98 lending credence to 'Chief Judge Murphy's assertion, it 
also indicated that "a few simple words which need not be couched 
in terms of a negative direction against apportionment ... will be 
sufficient if they demonstratively express the testator's intent."99 
This latter language seems to indicate that less than an express 
direction not to apportion will be given effect. 1°O Whether an effective 
95. Remedial statutes are normally construed liberally to suppress the evil and 
advance the remedy. 3 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 29 (4th ed. 
1974). While statutes that are in derogation of the common law are given a strict 
construction, Maryland's Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act is both a 
remedial statute and one in derogation ofthe common law. Notwithstanding the 
remedial nature of the statute, the rule of liberal construction Will yield to a strict 
construction when application of the rule would defeat the purpose of the 
legislation. ld. "[A] testator generally reads with care only the dispositive 
provisions of a will and not the so-called 'boilerplate.' " Brief for Amicus Curiae 
at 5, Johnson v. Hall, 283 Md. 644, 392 A.2d 1103 (1978). Only a strict 
construction of the "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in the will" language in MD. 
EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-109(k) (1974) will afford the necessary protection 
to testators who may not foresee the tax 'allocation problems arising from a 
boilerplate tax clause. . 
96. Johnson v. Hall, 283 Md. 644, 657, 392 A.2d 1103, 1111 (1978) (Murphy, C.J., 
dissenting). 
97. ld. at 662, 392 A.2d at 1113-14 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting). 
Discussing what the Maryland General Assembly might have meant when it 
drafted the word "expressly" into some of its statutory provisions but not others, 
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in Caruthers v. Buscher, 38 Md. App. 
661, 382 A.2d 608 (1978), noted that "a comparison of terms, in pursuance of the 
maxim that 'if the Legislature wanted such and such it could have said so as it 
did elsewhere' " was not of much assistance. ld. at 671 n.9, 382 A.2d at 614 n.9. 
See text accompanying notes 81-91 supra. 
In Sollersv. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 262 Md. 606,278 A.2d 581 
(1971), the court of appeals interpreted the statutory phrase "[u]nless a contrary 
intention expressly appears," in MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 1-21",(d) (1974) 
(emphasis supplied), to mean "in the absence of a clear expression of contrary 
intention." 262 Md. at 610, 278 A.2d at 583. This interpretation is reasonable and, 
if it were actually the legislature's intended definition, the Chief Judge's 
contention would be accurate. . 
98. 283 Md. at 649, 392 A.2d at 1106. 
99. ld. at 649, 392 A.2d at 1107 (citation omitted). 
100. Nevertheless, clarity of expression remains the standard by which the efficacy of 
testamentary directives against estate tax apportionment will be measured. The 
Johnson court expressly adopted the principle "that a statute directing 
apportionment will be ignored only if the testator clearly and unambiguously 
indicates that to be his intention." ld. at 652, 392 A.2d at 1108. 
Although the court of appeals had no prior occasion to adopt this principle 
with regard to estate tax apportionment,. there is Maryland case precedent 
indicating that testamentary language must be clear and unambiguous when 
directing that inheritance taxes, normally apportioned, are to be allocated to the 
residuary estate. Cf, General German Aged People's Home v. Johns Hopkins 
Hosp., 170 Md. 128, 183 A. 247 (1936) (general testamentary direction to pay 
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direction against apportionment can be couched in less than express, 
yet unambiguous, language must await further decisions. lol This 
issue was not resolved in Johnson because the controverted 
language was neither express nor unambiguous. 102 
Also contained in the dissent is the suggestion that the bequest 
to the residuary beneficiary was ample. This suggestion is used to 
support the argument that the testatrix intended that her son's 
residuary share bear the entire burden of the estate tax, rather than 
apportioning it among the other presumably less-munificently-
provided-for legatees. 103 The reasoning underlying this contention is 
at best conjectural, inasmuch as the amount of wealth considered 
ample will vary widely from person to person. Moreover, it can as 
taxes was not sufficient direction against apportionment of inheritance taxes) 
(this case is captioned Textor v. Textor in unofficial report). 
101. It is conceivable that a result contrary to Johnson would occur were a Maryland 
testator to demonstrate in the remainder of his will a clear intention to avoid 
apportionment. The Johnson court appears to have adopted the "examination of 
the entire will" approach applied in In re Crozier's Estate, 105 N.H. 400, 201 A.2d 
895 (1964). In Crozier, the New Hampshire court noted that the testatrix' tax 
clause standing alone did not clearly direct against apportionment, but by its 
examination of the entire will the court found that the testatrix preferred the 
specific legatees and intended that they be freed from their estate tax 
responsibilities. Hence, the court held that the taxes should be paid from the 
residue. Id. at 442, 201 A.2d at 896. Oregon expressly adopted the Crozier 
approach in Skaggs v. Yunck, 10 Or. App. 536, 539, 599 P.2d 1230, 1231 (1972). 
The Skaggs court held that a tax clause alone did not clearly indicate an intent 
to avoid apportionment, and its examination of the rest of the will revealed no 
evidence that would bolster the assertion that the testator intended not to 
apportion the estate taxes. See Brieffor Amicus Curiae at 8, Johnson v. Hall, 283 
Md. 644, 392 A.2d 1103 (1978). Similarly, the Johnson court examined Catherine 
Johnson's will as a whole and decided that she did not intend to avoid 
apportionment. The court noted that her use of a marital deduction trust, 
perpetuities savings clause, and common disaster clause indicated care and 
precision in the drafting of her will. 283 Md. at 656, 392 A.2d at 1110. Moreover, 
the court found that the second item of her will directing that the gift of her 
interest in the Johnson residence be freed from mortgages indicated that Dr. 
Johnson was well aware of a proper method of exonerating a bequest from an 
encumbrance when she wished to do so. Id. at 656, 392 A.2d at 1111. 
102. There is no question that the language within "Article FIRST" of Dr. Johnson's 
will directing the early payment of taxes was ambiguous. Both the court of 
appeals, 283 Md. 644, 649, 392 A.2d 1103, 1107, and the court of special appeals, 
38 Md. App. 589, 596, 382 A.2d 332, 336, adopted the principle that "[i]n a tax 
allocation problem the text of the will is to be scanned only to see if there is a 
clear direction not to apportion; and if such explicit direction is not found, 
construction of the text ceases because the statute states the rule," in support of 
their opposite decisions. 
Declarations of a testator's intent both prior to and contemporaneous with 
the execution of his will are admissible where his intention is not clearly 
ascertainable on the face of the will. E.g., Veditz v. Athey, 239 Md. 435, 449, 212 
A.2d 115, 123 (1965); Shellady v. Herliky, 236 Md. 461, 474, 204 A.2d 504, 511 
(1964). In Shellady, the court stated, "[ w ]here ... there is a latent ambiguity, 
declarations of intention are admissible, with extrinsic evidence, in the 
interpretation of the latent ambiguity, but declarations are admissible only for 
the purpose of establishing what the testator understood was signified by the 
words employed in the will." Id. While the orphans' court could have received 
oral or written extrinsic evidence as to what Catherine Johnson actually 
intended when "Article FIRST" was drafted, apparently none was offered. 
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readily be contended that the testatrix would view the appellee-
doctors, practitioners of a remunerative profession, as less in need of 
a gratuitous transfer of wealth than her son, the residuary legatee, 
whose recurring mental illness might handicap his future employ-
ment opportunities. 
As evidenced by its inclusion of an exception provision enabling 
the testator to direct that his taxes not be apportioned,104 the 
Maryland General Assembly did not intend to contravene the basic 
rule that the intent of the testator as ascertained from the four 
comers of his will controls the disposition of his estate.105 In so far 
as the court of special appeals held the view that the uniformity of 
construction clause in Maryland's Uniform Estate Tax Apportion-
ment Act required it to follow precedent from Uniform Act 
jurisdictions in construing Dr. Johnson's will,106 it contravened that 
basic proposition by holding that the construction placed upon 
similar language by the courts of those jurisdictions must be 
followed mechanically, without independent consideration being 
given to the testator's intent in using that language. Adoption ofthis 
view as the ratio decidendi for deciding Johnson creates, in effect, a 
rule of law insensitive to a testator's intent, rather than a rule of 
construction.107 
The court of appeals, on the other hand, did not feel constrained 
by the uniformity clause to construe "Article FIRST" of Dr. 
Johnson's will in harmony with courts from other Uniform Act 
jurisdictions. lOB The decision of the court of appeals implicitly 
recognizes that mechanical adoption of precedent exalts form over 
substance and trammels the intent of the testator.109 Moreover, 
subtle distinctions in intent, reflected in nuances of language in tax 
clauses, cannot be given effect if the determination of their import is 
103. Johnson v. Hall, 283 Md. 644, 655, 392 A.2d 1103, 1111 (1978) (Murphy, C.J., 
dissenting). 
104. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-109(k) (1974). 
105. E.g., Wesley Home, Inc. v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 265 Md. 185, 198, 
289 A.2d 337, 344 (1972). The Johnson court acknowledged this when it stated, 
"[tJhis enactment ... is in harmony with the firmly established rule that, unless 
prohibited by statute or public policy, the intent of the testator as ascertained 
from the four comers of the will controls the disposition of a decedent's estate." 
283 Md. at 648-49, 392 A.2d at 1106. 
106. Hall v. Johnson, 38 Md. App. 589, 593-94, 382 A.2d 332, 335 (1978). 
107. "No two testators are situated precisely the same, and it is both unsafe and 
unjust to interpret the will of one man by the dubious light afforded by the will of 
another." Bradbury v. Jackson, 97 Me. 449, 455, 54 A. 1068, 1070 (1903). 
108. See text accompanying notes 68-70 supra. 
109. In Moore v. Emery, 137 Me. 259, _, 18 A.2d 781, 790 (1941), the court stated: 
There is no particular magic in isolated phrases. Language which may 
mean one thing when applied to one state of facts may have to be 
interpreted differently when applied to another. Precedents are of less 
importance than elsewhere in the law; and to quite an extent each case 
must be considered by itself. 
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made solely so as to promote uniformity among jurisdictionsYo As 
was stated by Jeremy Bentham 150 years ago, "[i]n evident reason 
and common justice, no . . . will ought to be taken as a rule for any 
other; no more than the evidence in one cause is a rule for the 
evidence to different facts in another cause."lll 
Whatever significance a clause merely directing that debts and 
expenses be paid may have had in the past, today such ritualistic 
preambles perform no legal function regarding who must pay estate 
debts and expenses.ll2 Were the clause omitted from the will, debts 
and expenses would be exacted from the residuary estate, absent a 
contrary direction. The inclusion of taxes in such a boilerplate 
recitation should not be construed to evidence a desire to change the 
source from which estate taxes are usually satisfied. Rather, the fact 
that debts, expenses, and taxes all share the quality of being exacted 
inexorably from decedents' estates is a sufficient logical basis for 
their being grouped together in a pro forma clause. Language such 
as that in "Article FIRST" of Dr. Johnson's will may be viewed as 
an acknowledgment by the testatrix that such charges are owing, 
legally and morally, and that it is her foremost intention to satisfy 
the claims of her creditors - both public and private. 
Finally, the Johnson decision promotes the remedial function 
the apportionment statute was designed to perform. The statute was 
enacted because application of the common law rule frequently 
severely diminished the share of residuary beneficiaries - a result 
often unintended and unforeseen by the testator.lIS Frustration of 
the remedial purposes that prompted enactment of the apportionment 
statute becomes probable in any instance when language that falls 
short of being a clear direction not to apportion is given effect. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Maryland's Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act was 
enacted in order to abrogate a rule of common law that operated to 
diminish the legacies of residuary beneficiaries. In Johnson v. 
Hall,1l4 the court of appeals adhered to the purpose underlying this 
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legislation by holding boilerplate language in Dr. Catherine 
Johnson's will to be ineffective as a directive to depart from the 
statutory apportionment scheme. The decision is consonant with the 
cardinal principle of will construction in apportionment disputes 
that an intent not to apportion estate taxes must be expressed 
clearly and unambiguously. Johnson, when read in conjunction with 
two other recent Maryland cases,115 indicates the courts' unwilling-
ness to limit the application of remedial statutes governing the 
construction of wills. These decisions reveal that clarity of expres-
sion is the benchmark by which Maryland courts guage the efficacy 
of testamentary language directing against the application of such 
legislation. 
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